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Single Idea 4034

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates ]

Full Idea

Evading properties by means of predicates is implausible when things change. If a cold thing becomes hot, first 'cold' applies, and then 'hot', but what have predicates to do with the temperature of an object?

Clarification

The claim is that properties are in nature, not in language

Gist of Idea

Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature

Source

David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.161

A Reaction

A clear illustration of why properties are part of nature, not just part of language. But some applications of predicates are more arbitrary than this (ugly, cool)

The 17 ideas from 'Properties'

4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]